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ABSTRACT
Background Technology, equipment and medical
devices are vital for effective healthcare throughout the
world but are associated with risks. These risks include
device failure, inappropriate use, insufficient user-training
and inadequate inspection and maintenance. Further
risks within the developing world include challenging
conditions of temperature and humidity, poor
infrastructure, poorly trained service providers, limited
resources and supervision, and inappropriately complex
equipment being supplied without backup training for its
use or maintenance.
Methods This document is the product of an expert
working group established by WHO Patient Safety to
define the measures being taken to reduce these risks.
It considers how the provision of safer technology
services worldwide is being enhanced in three ways:
through non-punitive and open reporting systems of
technology-related adverse events and near-misses, with
classification and investigation; through healthcare
quality assessment, accreditation and certification; and
by the investigation of how appropriate design and an
understanding of the conditions of use and associated
human factors can improve patient safety.
Results and discussion Many aspects of these steps
remain aspirational for developing countries, where
highly disparate needs and a vast range of technology-
related problems exist. Here, much greater emphasis
must be placed on failsafe, durable and user-friendly
designdexamples of which are described.
INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity and usage of equipment and tech-
nology within healthcare are growing rapidly, with
over US$130 billion spent in the USA alone in 2006
on medical devices.1 Although essential for
advances in modern medicine, many established
and associated risks of technology continue.2 It is
therefore paramount to reduce the potential risk
using a combination of methods that link human
factors, equipment and the healthcare environ-
ment, as shown in ﬁgure 1.
A WHO Patient Safety working group was
established to consider how existing technology
can be made safer. The group includes representa-
tives from high-, middle- and low-income countries
with expertise in clinical medicine, academia,
policy, health services management and industry. It
is guided by a panel of international experts and
draws on the scientiﬁc literature, where available,
that is associated with the safety of current tech-
nology in the healthcare environment. Educational
bodies and health service providers were
approached to provide information on the speciﬁc
technology problems that developing countries face.
This report on this work is global in its scope,
considering both the developed and developingworld.
We have used the deﬁnition of ‘Health Tech-
nology ’ adopted by the Health Technology Assess-
ment programme in the UKd‘a range of methods
used to promote health, prevent and treat disease
and improve rehabilitation and long-term care,
including drugs, devices, procedures, settings of care
and screening’dbut have avoided any analysis of
pharmacovigilance efﬁcacy. One paper within the
supplement recommends an agenda for future
research within the ﬁeld, whereas another outlines
how new technology can be introduced safely.
We have identiﬁed four broad themes:
< The importance of reporting and learning
systems to identify areas where technology is
unsafedimportantly, these demonstrate that
even in equipment-rich environments, such as
critical care and anaesthetics, fewer than one in
10 incidents of healthcare-associated harm or
death are attributable to actual device failure or
faults.3 4
< Establishing systems of healthcare accreditation
to ensure continuous evaluation and quality
improvement.
< Because the majority of adverse incidents are
associated with improper use and problems at
the interface between equipment, users and
patients, greater consideration needs to be
given to human factors5 and intelligent redesign.
< The speciﬁc challenges and issues in developing
countries.
ADVERSE INCIDENT REPORTING
Reporting systems provide a mechanism for
enhancing patient safety through learning from
failures reported by healthcare workers. They
reﬂect a measure of progress towards achieving
a safety culture. The primary purpose of reporting
systems for adverse incidents and near-misses
within healthcare is to learn from experience.6
However, reporting systems do not improve safety
directly. It is the analysis of reports and subsequent
dissemination and implementation of recommen-
dations (eg, announcing recalls and safety alerts)4
that leads to changes. Serious incident reports
should trigger an extensive investigation to identify
underlying systems failures and lead to efforts to
redesign the systems to prevent recurrences.
Although most incident reporting systems suffer
from under-reporting for a variety of reasons,7 8 and
are restricted by a lack of denominator data, there
are several ways in which reporting can lead to
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< Early warning systems for device failure: These can generate
alerts regarding new and unsuspected hazards, and ‘accidents
waiting to happen,’ as a means of achieving prevention
without the need to learn from an injury.9 This could result
from a few similar incoming reports picked up by human
review of previously unrecognised complications associated
with the use of a new device. For example, even if only a few
people report that free-ﬂow protection on a particular pump
model can fail, that might be sufﬁcient for the receivers of the
reports to recognise the problem, alert the providers and
communicate directly with the pump manufacturer.
< Early warning systems for poor device design: Reporting
could identify an important gap in current safety systems,
such as devices with designs or interfaces that allow or induce
misuse in ways that can produce serious adverse even-
tsdeven though they still meet the manufacturer ’s
speciﬁcations and pass regulatory standards. Conversely,
a well-known example of surveillance failure is the software
bugs of the Therac-25 linear accelerator for radiation therapy
during the mid-1980s.10 Inadequate reporting mechanisms
and communication between hospitals, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and manufacturer were partly respon-
sible for ongoing fatal radiation overdoses in six patients over
a period of 18 months.
< Detecting problems that occur after several years: Some
problems are not highlighted during short premarket studies
and take years to become apparent.
< Detecting problems that rarely occur: By summing a large
number of reports, it is possible to detect rare problems or
complications that would not be detected by premarketing
studies of limited size. This is the major thinking behind
pharmacovigilance systems.11
< Opportunity for analysis: Analysis of many reports by the
receiving agency or others can reveal unrecognised trends and
hazards requiring attention. Analysis of multiple reports can
lead to insights into underlying systems failures or speciﬁc
patient factors associated with technologically related
adverse events.12 13 This generates both priority areas for
remedial efforts and educational recommendations for ‘best
practices.’
Surveillance/reporting methods
There is no ‘gold standard’ for the surveillance or identiﬁcation
of Medical Device Related Events (MDREs) or their subsequent
reporting.5 Samore et al compared six methods for exclusively
highlighting MDREs, in a US tertiary teaching hospital in 2000.
Importantly, they found minimal overlap in the events identiﬁed
by the different methods.14 During 20441 inpatient stays, an
online incident reporting system voluntarily completed by
healthcare professionals highlighted only 80 MDREs, whereas
1359 reports were logged to the hospital’s clinical engineering
department. During the 9-month study, 1122 International
Classiﬁcation of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) MDRE-related
codes were ascribed by the hospital’s administration at patient
discharge, and a postdischarge patient survey found that 7% of
patients considered that there had been problems with medical
devices during their stay. A voluntary telemetry checklist yielded
no MDREs. This study found that automated surveillance of the
electronic medical record (previously shown to detect adverse
drug events)15 using seven selected ‘ﬂags’ had a 7.8% positive
predictive value (PPV), with only 552 out of 7059 ‘ﬂagged’ events
being actual MDREs.
By using an example of an incident-management system
based on a universal classiﬁcation system, 43 desirable attributes
of an integrated framework for safety, quality and risk
management have been described previously.9 Once this classi-
ﬁcation can be agreed internationally (see below), work could
proceed under the auspices of WHO Patient Safety on devel-
oping standards, ﬁeld formats for data collection, aggregation,
storage and analysis, and, ultimately, make it easy to allow data
sharing and the creation of a universal database, as fore-
shadowed in 2002.13
International classification for patient safety
To date, incident reporting has been compromised by a lack of
agreed deﬁnitions and preferred terms for the key concepts
necessary to describe the attributes, characteristics, limitations
and pitfalls of underlying healthcare technologies.16 17 To
promote a common understanding and ease the comparison of
international datasets from different reporting systems, WHO
Patient Safety commissioned work to develop a framework for
an International Classiﬁcation for Patient Safety (ICPS)
(ﬁgure 2).18 19
Sources of information for the ICPS include incident reports,
medicolegal ﬁles, coroners’ recommendations, complaints and
audits. Clinical engineering departments also use failure-related
data extracted from computerised medical-equipment manage-
ment systems for risk-management purposes. Reporting via
a call centre equipped with the appropriate software for eliciting
the information needed to populate a classiﬁcation such as the
ICPS would be cost-effective and require little infrastructure.
Such a system is being used successfully in South Africa
(see box 1). The database is populated in English using operators
who speak English as well as the language of the reporter.20
Collecting information from all available sources into a clas-
siﬁcation system such as the ICPS can help to identify problems
early. Clinicians and regulatory authorities in that jurisdiction,
as well as in other countries, can then be alerted.
Importance of transparent non-punitive reporting
To encourage reporting and an appropriate response within the
prevalent ‘blame culture,’ successful patient safety reporting
systems must employ a non-punitive ‘just culture’ approach21 22
except in the case of signiﬁcant negligence. Neither reporters nor
Figure 1 Reducing the risk associated with technology within
healthcare. Mechanisms for addressing and reducing risk associated
with technology in healthcare.
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others involved in the incidents should be punished as a result of
reporting, with the knowledge that adverse events and errors are
symptoms of defective systems, not defects themselves. Figure 3
shows the sharp rise in telephone reporting to the Advanced
Incident Management System (AIMS) in South Africa’s North
West Hospitals with a just culture approach in which staff were
given the written assurance that they would not be punished
regarding adverse incident reports. This excluded staff that
displayed reckless behaviour by ignoring well-known safety
protocols but included human error and at-risk behaviour (staff
who did not know that they were doing wrong). Many systems
offer the option of reporter anonymity, which increases the rate
of reporting.20 23
Types of reporting systems
The most modest reporting systems are local audit. For example,
a recent Tanzanian audit suggested that a quarter of perinatal
deaths were associated with inadequate maternal and fetal heart
monitoring.24 If the audit cycle is completed, awareness of these
deﬁciencies leads to improved safety.25
Generally, reporting systems can be either mandatory or
voluntary and either held in complete conﬁdence or reported to
the public or to regulatory agencies. Reporting systems are
generally internal or external and are open-ended, capturing all
adverse events across care delivery, or focus on particular types
of events such as predeﬁned serious injuries, epidemiological
outcomes such as the emergence of antimicrobial resistance or
blood transfusion events. An example of the latter is the UK’s
Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT) organisation, which
was established in 1996 to encourage all hospitals in the UK to
participate in haemovigilance to enable the identiﬁcation and
dissemination of solutions to make transfusion safer. Since its
inception, SHOT has borne the hallmarks of an effective vigi-
lance system with rising reporting accompanied by a steady
decline in transfusion-associated mortality in the UK.26
Formats and processes within different reporting systems vary
from prescribed forms with deﬁned data elements to free-text
reporting. It is imperative that sufﬁcient information is provided
for subsequent analysisdfor example, the make and model of
ventilator.4 The system might allow for reports to be submitted
in various formats including mail or telephone,5 although elec-
tronic submission is arguably easier27 and becoming more
commonplace.
Some systems primarily have learning objectives, for example
for device reporting to the FDA,28 29 whereas others are designed
to provide accountability. Rather than ensure a minimum
standard of care, learning systems are designed to foster
Figure 2 Conceptual framework for the International Classification for
Patient Safety (ICPS). Maximum information collected from all adverse
events and near misses is grouped into incident types (‘medical device/
equipment/property’ and ‘infrastructure/building/fixtures’ having direct
relevance to technology). During the incident, mitigating factors prevent
or moderate harm to the patient. Organisational outcomes refer to the
effects on the organisation, such as appropriation of resources to the
affected patient. Adapted from Sherman et al.19
Box 1 How the safety of technology in developing world
healthcare can benefit from incident reporting systems
Incident reporting in South Africa
In South Africa, COHSASA is piloting the Advanced Incident
Management System (AIMS) previously developed in Australia.
Healthcare staff report problems via telephone to a call centre
where data are recorded onto the AIMS database. These prob-
lems are then analysed and a report is quickly sent back to the
institution. AIMS also assesses the institution’s response to the
report. In South Africa, insufficient consumables have been
immediately evident as frequent causes of adverse events that
are quickly rectifiable. For example, the absence of Yankauer
suction tubing led to the death of a patient because it was not
possible to perform tracheal suction. Similarly, an unexpected
neonatal death occurred because of a failure to recognise the
deterioration of simple physiological parameters in a newborn
because there were insufficient pulse oximeters. (Case reports
provided by COHSASA.)
Figure 3 How a ‘just culture’ improves reporting: the rise in telephone
reporting of adverse incidents to the Advanced Incident Management
System in South Africa’s North West Hospitals after a guarantee to staff
of a non-punitive just culture during the first 10 months of 2008. Adapted
from data provided by the Council for Health Service Accreditation of
Southern Africa.
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continuous improvements in care delivery by identifying themes
in adverse events and near-misses, reducing variation in their
incidence, facilitating the sharing of best practices and stimu-
lating system-wide improvements. Incident reporting within
learning systems is usually voluntary, and, via careful expert
analysis of the underlying root causes, recommendations are
made to redesign and improve the performance of systems in
order to reduce errors and injuries. For example, the National
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) in England and Wales
receives reports of patient safety incidents from local healthcare
organisations. Its annual summary in November 2008 found
that 27% of the 656 781 inhospital reports were about problems
arising from medical devices or equipment.30 About 1% of these
caused death or severe harm to the patient.31
Conversely, reporting in accountability systems is usually
mandatory and restricted to a list of deﬁned serious events (also
called ‘sentinel’ events) such as unexpected death, transfusion
reaction and surgery on the wrong body part. Accountability
systems typically prompt improvements by requiring an inves-
tigation and systems analysis (‘root cause analysis’) of the event.
However, few regulatory agencies have the resources to perform
external investigations of more than a small fraction of reported
events, which limits their capacity to learn. Table 1 gives further
examples of both systems.
Most accountability systems hold healthcare organisations
accountable by requiring that serious mishaps be reported.
Furthermore, they provide disincentives to unsafe care through
citations, penalties or sanctions. The effectiveness of these
systems depends on the ability of the agency to induce health-
care organisations to report serious events and to conduct
thorough investigations.
For any system, the analysis of reports with assessment of risk
needs to be prompt, with notiﬁcation of serious hazards being
made without delay. With a large number of reports, estimations
of the probability of recurrence of a speciﬁc type of adverse event
or error can be calculated. Analysis of reported outcomes can
also produce an estimate of the average severity of harm caused
by the incident or type of incident.34 Risk analysis should be
carried out by the most appropriate committees found within
the healthcare facility. Depending on the institution, this might
include an advisory committee on healthcare technology, the
resuscitation committee, a health and safety committee or
a theatre-users committee. Findings from reporting systems
inform new safety initiatives that are generated and imple-
mented by the appropriate authority. For example, the sugges-
tion that adequate monitoring with capnography and oximetry
would have resulted in the detection of 88% of the ﬁrst 2000
anaesthesia-related adverse events reported to AIMS in
Australia35 had a major impact on the International Standard for
Anaesthesia Safety that was endorsed in 1994.36
Unfortunately, the national and international reporting and
surveillance systems that exist in developed countries are scarce
or new in developing countries (box 1), and little is known about
the frequency or impact of events involving medical devices.
HEALTHCARE QUALITY ASSESSMENT, ACCREDITATION AND
CERTIFICATION
Evaluating, certifying and monitoring the quality of the provi-
sion of healthcare services using agreed standards is an excellent
method of improving the safety of healthcare technology,
particularly when it prompts change, subsequent reappraisal and
a culture of continuous improvement, problem solving and
critical self-examination. Quality assurance and improvement
are achieved by ensuring standards of governance, using perfor-
mance measures or indicators to measure an organisation’s
performance and encouraging the use of guidelines. Accredita-
tion sceptics cite an increased workload, particularly for hospital
middle management, a lack of consistency and signiﬁcant cost.
With reference to technology, however, accreditation can
encourage training and continued professional development,
improve audit and catalyse change to equipment and estates.37
Examples include the Joint Commission and the Community
Health Accreditation Program (CHAP) from the USA, the Trent
Accreditation Scheme (TAS) in the UK and the Australian
Council on Healthcare Standards.
Quality assurance is possible in the developing world:38 39 in
South Africa, COHSASA uses standards that deﬁne the key
functions, activities, processes and structures required for the
Table 1 Further examples and descriptions of both learning and accountability types of reporting systems
Learning systems Description
Advanced Incident Monitoring System A system developed by the Australia Patient Safety Foundation and used by 200 Australian healthcare
organisations for voluntary report submission. It uses the Healthcare Incident Types classification system,
which elicits detailed information from the reporter regarding incident types, contributing factors,
outcomes, actions and consequences. Statistical analysis of the relationship between the 1 million
potential permutations of data describing each incident becomes useful.
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency in the UK Healthcare professionals, industry and the public relay concerns about medical devices and medicines.
In 2007, there were 8634 adverse incidents investigated related to medical devices, including packaging
failures compromising sterility, faulty point of care/home tests (eg, those used for glucose monitoring)
and pregnancy testing kits displaying false-negative results.32 Although their investigations suggest that
the responsibility lies as often with the healthcare establishment and end user as it does with the
manufacturer, Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency issued Medical Device Alerts on
products such as vascular and dialysis devices, counterfeit condoms and infusion and feeding pumps.
Japan Council for Quality Health Care Voluntary reporting of adverse eventsdparticularly sentinel events with root cause analysis
National Electronic Injury Surveillance System in the USA This monitors the safety of medical equipment in the community by recording the details of injuries
caused by consumer products that require attendance at an emergency department. Between July 1999
and June 2000, there were 454 383 attendances, mostly caused by physical trauma from wheelchairs,
scooters and other walking devices.33
Accountability systems Description
Sentinel events in Slovenia Sentinel events must be notified to the Ministry of Health within 48 h; 45 days later, a satisfactory
analysis with corrective actions must be submitted; otherwise a follow-up consultation with the ministry
occurs
Health Care Inspectorate of The Netherlands Hospitals must report adverse events that have led to death or permanent impairment
Some States of the USA Certain types of serious, usually preventable events must be reported
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health facility departments to be in a position to provide quality
Healthcare Technology Management services (HTM) that meet
the principles set out by the International Society for Quality in
Health Care (ISQua).40 Accreditation is provided if minimum
standards are demonstrated across seven areas: medical equip-
ment support, healthcare technology planning, policies and
procedures, medical equipment management, staff training,
quality improvement and equipment safety. The ‘equipment
safety ’ area assesses the institutions’ risk management and
performance testing services, as well as the safety of the working
conditions for the staff and their involvement in electrical safety
training. In a typical programme, a baseline survey of an entire
hospital is undertaken. Areas of non-compliance are identiﬁed,
which for COHSASA are more commonly HTM planning,
equipment safety and quality improvement. A multidisciplinary,
continuous quality improvement approach follows, and external
surveys are carried out by peers at various stages during the
process. Figure 4 shows how mean levels of compliance across
COHSASAs seven areas of HTM can be improved.
A culture of quality and safety has also been encouraged in
Ghana with the establishment of a Non-Governmental Orga-
nisation (NGO) called the Ghana Quality Organisation collab-
orating with the Ghana Health Service to launch a series of
workshops, seminars and conferences.41
Certification of technological products within healthcare
Medical product regulation and certiﬁcation relies heavily on the
use of agreed standards from international NGOs such as the
International Organisation for Standardisation42 (ISO with 163
member countries) and the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC with 56 member countries). Standards include
common safety symbols, common nomenclature and common
paths for the validation of the safe usability of medical devices.
The standards are nevertheless intended to allow individual
manufacturers freedom to design their own solutions. The use of
standards has given a strengthened focus on safety issues
through safety-oriented standards such as quality-management
systems and risk management applied to medical devices.43e45
However, this certiﬁcation is more common in industrialised
countries with existing regulatory frameworks. Furthermore,
certiﬁcation bodies are usually based in these richer countries,
despite commendable efforts from standardisation bodies to
increase stakeholder representation from all geographical areas
and interest groups. Many advocate a widened stakeholder base
in standardisation work. This would not only encompass the
medical device industry, but also require more input from
healthcare professionals, safety professionals and regulatory
agenciesdthe latter providing invaluable information from
adverse event reporting and postmarket surveillance systems.
ERROR, HUMAN FACTORS AND SYSTEMS DESIGN
Human error
An error has been deﬁned by WHO Patient Safety as ‘failure to
carry out a planned action as intended or application of an
incorrect plan.’18 Within the context of medicine, an adverse
event is deﬁned as ‘an unintended harm caused by medical
management, rather than by a disease process, serious enough to
lead to prolonged hospital admission, temporary or permanent
disability to the patient.’46 James Reason has divided the
investigation of human error into the person approach or the
system approach.47 The person approach focuses on the errors of
individuals, with blame for forgetfulness, inattention or moral
weakness. This is rare, and only illustrated by high-proﬁle cases
such as those of the family doctor Harold Shipman48 and nurse
Beverley Allit.49 The system approach focuses upon the work
conditions, bringing with it the concept of ergonomicsdthe
science of designing the job, equipment and workplace to ﬁt the
worker.
Reason states that latent conditions can provoke error in the
workplace, through time pressures or inadequate stafﬁng. Such
conditions can lie dormant for long periods before they combine
with active failures to produce an adverse event. Reason has
famously proposed the ‘Swiss cheese model’ of error, whereby
layers of swiss cheese act as defences to error.47 However, each
layer has holes within it that are under a state of dynamic shift
with regard to their presence, size and position. Each hole within
a slice does not normally lead to a poor outcome, but when
a number of holes in several layers line up, the potential for error
production and propagation is great.
Vincent has expanded upon Reason’s model to provide a clas-
siﬁcation of error-producing factors within a framework that can
affect clinical practice.50 These range from task design and use of
protocols, through to team communication and organisational
structures. The report ‘To err is human’ was seminal in
proposing that events causing or risking harm to patients were
more likely to result from systemic failure,51 rather than the
actions of individuals. The report suggested that efforts to
improve patient safety should move away from a ‘blame culture’
and focus on removing ‘error-provoking’ aspects of care delivery
systems. However, the traditional view of blaming and
retraining an individual still prevails.52
Figure 4 Healthcare Technology
Management (HTM) scores for 25
facilities at baseline and after quality
improvement. The mean performance
indicator scores were measured over
5 years for the seven HTM areas at
baseline (green bar) and after quality
improvement at least 18 months later
(blue bar) in 25 different institutions in
South Africa. Scores greater than 80 are
acceptable, and scores under 40 are
considered highly unsatisfactory.
Adapted from Council for Health Service
Accreditation of Southern Africa data.
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Measurement of error
Measurement of error is difﬁcult. Within the context of inter-
vention, it is possible toproduce aprotocol that deﬁnes the steps in
a prescribed order. Any deviation from this is deﬁned as error. This
approach, also known as Human Reliability Analysis, was
explored by Joice et al during observation of laparoscopic surgical
procedures.53 The aim was to deﬁne competent performance,
although the study also demonstrated tasks thatweremore prone
to error and instruments that were more likely to be associated
with an error. The problem with such a tool is that it is quite
focused upon the task in hand, and it is very difﬁcult to consider
the wider environment of the operating theatre with regards to
patient factors, team factors and environmental factors.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a procedure for
analysis of potential failure modes within a system for classiﬁ-
cation by severity or determination of the effect of failures on
the system.54 Failure modes are any errors or defects in a process,
design or item, especially those that affect the customer
(patient), and can be potential or actual. Effects analysis refers to
studying the consequences of those failures. This tool has been
hailed as a useful approach to identifying problems within wider
healthcare processes, with a focus upon the interaction with
technology. For example, FMEA has been used for analysis of
processes of care related to medication delivery, infusion pumps,
radiation therapy and suicide risk.54 Although a potentially
useful tool, it is a laborious process requiring expert opinion
upon the question in hand. Furthermore, its reliability has
recently been questioned, with the conclusion that healthcare
organisations should not depend solely upon FMEA ﬁndings to
direct resources towards patient safety.55
Human factors
With particular focus on medical technologies, the aim is not
only to produce high technology that serves a clinical purpose,
such as a mechanical ventilator, but to ensure that the error-
producing factors are considered with regards to placing such
a device into clinical practice. There is of course a need to
advance equipment design, but the importance of team struc-
ture and communication, organisational culture and crisis
management cannot be understated. In high-reliability organi-
sations such as the nuclear, oil and mining industries, these
aspects are collectively known as human factorsda discipline
that spans ergonomics, engineering and cognitive psychology.
Human factor analysis focuses on performance design, incor-
porating human strengths and limitations, leading to iterative
testing and evaluation. The importance of this concept to
medicine is that testing occurs within an already functioning
system (ie, in vivo) and could improve or endanger care.
The application of human factor approaches to medicine has
been led by the anaesthetic community. In the 1970s, escalating
litigation costs resulting from critical errors in anaesthesia led to
analysis of near misses and fatal errors. This, in turn, led to the
development of technologies to provide early warning of human
or equipment error. Safety advances included non-interchange-
able screw threads for different pipeline gases with the inlet on
the anaesthetic machine, to prevent the delivery of hypoxic
gases to the patient. Similarly, there has been work to develop
separate ‘lock and key ’ systems for intravenous and intrathecal
delivery of medicationdsee the case study in box 2.
Systems design
To enhance patient safety, it is necessary to concentrate upon
the systems approach to error and, in particular, upon latent
failures. Solutions to such error and subsequent adverse events
have been designed, investigated and implemented within
medicine. The most recent and widely known is perhaps the
WHO Surgical Safety Checklist project, which identiﬁes three
phases of an operation, each corresponding to a speciﬁc period in
the normal ﬂow of work: before the induction of anaesthesia
(sign in); before the incision of the skin (time out); and before
the patient leaves the operating room (sign out). In each phase,
a checklist coordinator must conﬁrm that the surgical team has
completed the listed tasks before it proceeds with the operation.
The checklist has been shown to reduce both patient morbidity
and mortality in both developed and developing nations.58 There
is now a drive for widespread use of the checklist.
The checklist is a very simple but effective technology that
aims to enhance patient safety; however, other technologies that
are already in use might be more difﬁcult to redesign. An
example of a piece of ongoing work at Imperial College is the
redesign of the resuscitation trolley. Traditionally, this is no more
than a workman’s tool trolley, although absolutely crucial
during a cardiac arrest. In the pressurised, time-critical and often
crowded environment of a cardiopulmonary arrest, it has been
shown that division of team roles with leadership and direction
of resuscitation algorithms are often lacking. This is
compounded by inaccessible contents and inadequate daily stock
checking.59 Collaborative work between clinicians, nurses,
psychologists, human factor specialists and engineers, using
footage of real and simulated arrests, has led to a drawer-free
open-layout resuscitation station with logical separation of
equipment (for airway, breathing and circulation); radio-
frequency identity technology has also been employed for
instantaneous stock checking.60 The trolley incorporates an
interactive touch screen to prompt the team leader and
encourage appropriate role adoption within the team, while the
software provides data capture for subsequent audit. Redesign
and renewal is not always a ﬁnancial possibility, however;
simply understanding how errors are created is sufﬁcient to
Box 2 Intelligent redesign resulting from a recurring
severe adverse event
Vincristine: Wayne Jowett
Wayne Jowett was in remission from acute leukaemia, under-
going the final stages of his treatment. He was being treated with
two chemotherapeutic drugs, vincristine given intravenously and
cytosine given intrathecally. By mistake he was given vincristine
intrathecally.56 Intrathecal vincristine causes paralysis and death.
Wayne died a month after the injection. There have been over 50
cases of intrathecal vincristine reported worldwide.5 Despite
awareness of the problem and repeated warning, this event still
occurs. A variety of solutions have been proposed,57 including
restrictions around seniority and training, separation of the
intrathecally and intravenous drugs in time and space and tech-
nical solutions. Separate ‘lock and key’ systems for intravenous
and intrathecal systems to prevent cross-use have long been
viewed as the solution but have proved hard to achieve. More
recently, the supply of vincristine in a ‘mini-bag’ of saline has
been used. The volume of saline is such that no doctor or nurse
would consider nor could inject the drug into the spinal space.
However, owing to the volume of fluid, the mini-bags are not safe
in the paediatric setting and so only represent a partial solution.
These solutions represent key examples of redesigning tech-
nology to make care safer.
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change the practice of the end user. For example, heuristic
violation assessment can be performed on widely used tech-
nologies such as infusion pumps to identify potential usability
problems.61
The standard process of blood transfusion is an inherently
dangerous process prone to human error. Through system-
atisation and multiple veriﬁcation steps, much of the error from
incorrect blood component transfusion has been removed. Bar
coding to verify correct identiﬁcation at multiple steps in the
transfusion, such as a process to match patient and blood
product at the bedside, has been introduced at the John Radcliffe
Hospital in Oxford, UK.62 Hand-held computers are used to scan
bar codes on the patient’s wrist band and the blood product to
ensure a match. Early data suggest that use of this system
increases checking behaviours; long-term study will establish if
there is a reduction in harm to patients.
Similarly, patient wrist band bar codes can be scanned
together with medication bar codes to try to avoid human
error.63 This increased complexity can have drawbacks,64 for
many reasons including time constraints and the possibility of
staff employing workaround strategies.65 However, human
factor analysis within the sphere of intravenous drug errors in
anaesthesia has demonstrated that the solutions need
not be complex: there is evidence that preﬁlled syringes,
colour-coding and syringe labelling immediately after drawing
up the drug, structured organisation of drug drawers and
different packaging and presentation of drugs in different
classes help.66
It is imperative that all end users appreciate that intelligent
redesign and safety systems will never eliminate risks from
human factors. Indeed, measures taken to address human
factors can increase complexity and, therefore, the propensity
for errors due to technical failure. For example, the anaesthetic
machine safety pins described in box 3 can be found to be
missing or become worn and bent. Therefore, qualiﬁed and
competent user vigilance is still required, along with contin-
uous professional development to keep abreast of changes in
technologies.
KEY ISSUES FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Insufﬁcient attention to patient safety in low-resource, devel-
oping-world settings has been the result of a lack of awareness
and inadequate ﬁnancial, human and communication resources.
In these settings, access to service and supplies is often limited,
and there are major infrastructure gaps, such as outdated facil-
ities, overcrowding, inadequate clean water, power and sanita-
tion. There has been a perceived limited market for appropriate
health technologies, and sometimes the only available technol-
ogies are designed for industrialised markets and are inappro-
priately complex. This causes both operating difﬁculty, with
inadequately trained healthcare professionals of low literacy, and
maintainance difﬁculties, particularly with extremes of
temperature and humidity.69 Governance within developing-
world healthcare is less advanced, and patients less aware of the
risks and their rights; there is a power imbalance between
patient and healthcare provider with poor reporting structures
and legal recourse. Some argue that the increased presence and
voice of professional medical bodies with their evidence-based
guidelines within the developed world puts pressure on
Box 3 How technology can be used to prevent human
error within anaesthesia
Anaesthetic misconnections
While human error is responsible for most adverse incidents
within anaesthesia, equipment inadequacies have been high-
lighted by the seminal papers on critical incident analysis by
Beecher in 195467 and Cooper in 1978.68 In the 1970s, escalating
litigation costs resulting from critical errors within anaesthesia
catalysed critical incident analysis in a manner that had previ-
ously been practised in the airline industry. This analysis of near-
misses and actual incidents led to developments in technology
that provide early warning of, or prevent, human and equipment
error. There was acceptance of national (eg, British Standards
Institution) and international standards (International Organisation
for Standardisation) for the components of anaesthetic machines.
Safety advances include non-interchangeable screw threads
between pipeline gases and the inlet on the anaesthetic machine,
along with alarms and mechanical devices to prevent the delivery
of hypoxic gas mixtures to the patient. Additionally, the pin index
safety system offers protection against accidental connection of
a pressurised gas cylinder to the wrong yolk. Each air, oxygen,
carbon dioxide, heliox and nitrous oxide cylinder top has a unique
arrangement of holes into which only the corresponding gas
yolk’s projecting pins can be inserted.
Box 4 Development of auto-disable hypodermic syringes
Points of safety
Disposable plastic hypodermic syringes were developed in the
1950s, partly solving the problems caused by inadequate steri-
lisation of reusable syringes and needles. However, inappropriate
reuse remains an issue, particularly within the developing world
where cost and the reluctance towards single use are important
factors. Reuse of syringes can cause transmission of nosocomial
bloodborne infections, including HIV and hepatitis B and C, and
has threatened the acceptability of immunisation programmes in
the developing world. This prompted a 1986 WHO request for
auto-disable syringe ideas. Over 400 designs were submitted,
involving ideas such as immobilisation of the plunger, blockage of
the needle and leakage when a second injection is attempted.
Currently available auto-disable systems or syringes with reuse
prevention features include the SoloShot, which has an internal
metal clip to lock the plunger after injection to prevent refilling;
the K1 syringe, which can serve curative injection needs as well
as immunisation; and the Uniject, which is a prefilled single-dose
non-reusable plastic bubble.71 All these systems can have inte-
grated needles to prevent needle reuse and are now manufac-
tured in more than 10 developing countries, priced at US
$0.1e0.3 more than standard disposable syringes.72 Uptake has
been boosted by Unicef replacing standard disposable syringes
for vaccination programmes with autodisable syringes. Safety
issues remain concerning the disposal problems inherent with
any disposable needle,73 and a lack of needle protection for the
prevention of sharps injuries. However, new low-cost needle
protection systems are under development. Significant reuse is
still prevalent in the curative sector, even within public health
facilities. Reuse will hopefully become unnecessary as the market
becomes saturated with K1 and similar devices that can replace
all syringe sizes and types used in most procedures.
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healthcare providers to provide safe technology for fear of
institutional negligence. Within the developing world, fewer
reports of concern and adverse incidents lead to continuation of
poor practices. Standards and regulations to ensure product
quality and safety can be inadequate, as well as the mechanisms
to enforce them. As a marker of inadequate access to quality
care, a patient in a low-resource health setting is at a 2e20-fold
higher risk of acquiring a facility or Healthcare-Acquired Infec-
tion (HAI) than a patient in a high-resource setting, where
approximately 5e10% of hospital patients suffer HAIs.70
Solutions need to be inexpensive to implement and designed
for low-resource settings (box 4). For example, many developing
countries have signiﬁcant problems providing skilled attendance
for obstetric emergencies. WHO Regional Ofﬁce for Africa
recommmends groups of young volunteers from the primary
healthcare level transporting appropriate patients to referral
level care using motorcyles or adapted vans, ﬁtted with radio
transmitters.74 Additionally, while it is sometimes culturally
difﬁcult, there is a limited evidence base for the provision of
small and simple ‘maternity waiting homes,’75 situated close to
the referral hospital. These homes are used by women in the
ﬁnal period of their pregnancy who are at risk of complications
or by those who live far from the referral hospital.76 Where
infants are born at home, infection risks are higher; however,
single-use delivery kits provide a sterile plastic delivery sheet,
razor blade, cord ties and soap with pictorial instructions for
low-literacy users. Tanzanian studies have shown this reduces
umbilical cord infection from 3.9% to 0.3% and puerperal sepsis
from 3.6% to 1.1%.77 Another issue with home births by
low-literacy traditional birth attendants is that detection of
Table 2 Clinical technological problems more marked in the developing world with implications and possible solutions
Issue Implications Possible solutions
Blood products < Hospital-based transfusion practices
still widespread due to centralised
blood collection and preparation being
too expensive
< Decreased availability of blood
products
< Dependence on family donors or
higher-risk paid donors
< Substandard laboratory support for
blood product refrigeration and virus/
parasite screening79
< Increased risk of transmission of
bloodborne infection to patient80
< Consistent quality local hospital-based
rapid serological testing until central-
isation becomes more affordable81
Infection control < Poor hand-washing facilities
< Substandard sterilisation and disinfec-
tion practices
< Increased Healthcare-Acquired Infec-
tion with increased reliance upon
antibiotics causing increased antibiotic
resistance
< Targetted by WHO Global Patient
Safety Challlenge: Clean Care is Safer
Care
< Alcohol-based hand sanitisers or other
novel disinfection products
< Building designs to combat airborne
infection spread are not available
< Ignorance of isolation methods in
wards
< Increased spread of contagious
diseases (eg, multidrug-resistant
strains of tuberculosis)
< Modular or locally appropriate building
designs
Anaesthetic equipment < Inadequate staff training for specific
machines
< Old anaesthetic machines and equip-
ment, unreliable oxygen and power
supplies
< For example, only 6% of anaesthetists
in Uganda have adequate facilities to
provide safe anaesthesia for caesarean
sections82 83
< Distance learning and interactive elec-
tronic tutorials
< Seminars and clinical teaching from
external tutors
< Preoperative surgical checklists56
< Unreliable supply of medical-grade
oxygen cylinders
< Electric-powered oxygen extraction
and concentration has been
a success84
< Solar-powered oxygen generators
Resuscitation equipment < Ongoing user education is deficient
< Users are sometimes low/non-literate
< Power source/batteries cause majority
of failures85deven laryngoscope
battery failure is a significant problem
< Planned Inspection and Preventive
Maintenance programmes are often
not strictly implemented
< Simple technologies with basic or
graphical instructions made obvious on
device
Cold chainmonitoring < Ageing refrigeration equipment, inter-
rupted power supply and poor main-
tenance86
< Major issues for vaccines, blood
supplies and other temperature-sensi-
tive medications at risk of spoilage
< New refrigeration technologies taking
advantage of new photo-electric,
insulation, cooling and energy storage
technologies
Diagnostic testing < Many patients are unable to return to
clinic for results
< Many tests are inaccurate or expen-
sive
< Incorrect or delayed diagnoses cause
individual morbidity and epidemics
< Rapid, affordable, point of care
immuno- and molecular diagnostics87
(eg, for HIV, TB, malaria88 and STIs)
Maternal and newborn care < Delays around referraldcentres are
often a considerable distanced80% of
African women live more than 5 km
from even a primary health centre and
have very poor transport options
< Unwillingness and inability to give birth
in hospital/institution
< Preference for traditional birth atten-
dants and decreased presence of
skilled birth attendants at delivery (eg,
only 40% in Africa)89
< Increased maternal and fetal compli-
cations
< Inadequate provision of timely
caesarian section, control of labour
pains, induction and ability to deal with
complications
< Low-birthweight/sick neonates not
readily identified
< Community-based transport options
< Mobile phone networks
< Readily available oxytocin and anti-
shock garment for postpartum
haemorrhage prevention and treatment
< Inadequate fetal heart rate monitoring
with often only a Pinard stethoscope
availabledrequires skill90
< Worse detection of and response to
perinatal distress/asphyxia
< Simplified, portable, rugged
oximeters91 and heart-rate monitors
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low-birthweight babies requiring treatment is more difﬁcult.
One novel solution has been the use of non-numeric tactile or
colour-coded indicator weighing scales.78 Table 2 outlines some
of the other challenges facing the developing world with rele-
vant implications and potential solutions where possible.
CONCLUSION
Although technology is pivotal for the advancement of health-
care, it can cause signiﬁcant harm if not adequately designed,
regulated and maintained. Although medical devices will have
CE markings under the medical devices directive (93/42EEC)
within Europe,92 and FDA approval in the USA, this level of
certiﬁcation must be ensured internationally and enforced
within the developing world, especially for higher-risk technol-
ogies. It is likely that this would be easier to achieve with
worldwide agreement on the minimum standards. Although it
has proven difﬁcult to acquire agreement on even common
nomenclature, the Global Harmonisation Task Force has
embarked upon this ambitious but important strategy.93 94
A recent example is the work performed by WHO and collab-
orators through the Global Pulse Oximetry Project to establish
global standards for the use of pulse oximetry in anaesthesia.91
Even with robust regulation of minimal requirements for their
design, however, healthcare technologies are vulnerable to
misuse and can create error in ways that can only be identiﬁed
through appropriate encouragement of non-punitive open
reporting. By classifying and investigating these near misses and
adverse events and recording them in national and international
databases, it becomes possible to establish root causes. As
described, data support the beneﬁts of these systems with
regards to safety of technology26 and they must be encouraged
in the developing world.
It is time to start work on internationally standardised prac-
tical methodologies and nomenclature for reporting systems and
on gathering information from all available sources based on the
ICPS, which is scheduled to be completed in the next 3 years.
A common data ﬁeld format and means of collection will allow
the development of a universal international events database.
This is possible with limited technology such as mobile phones
that are linked to reporting centres provided with the software
that elicits the information needed for populating the ICPS. This
data collection will pave the way for the ﬁnal stepdthe
dissemination and implementation of the lessons learnt. The
cost of implementing basic systems for safe technology must be
weighed against the current very high costs of not doing so.
Vital for the provision of safe technology are maintenance
programmes and consideration of intelligent redesign to reduce
the risks that are contributed by the end user. Furthermore, there
needs to be adequate training and education programmes for
healthcare professionals. Common standards for accreditation
and quality assurance schemes will also improve safety. In the
developing world, it is essential that all these safety mechanisms
and solutions be affordable, appropriate and, above all, able to be
realised.
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